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I. INTRODUCTION
Is water a "product" subject to the World Trade Organization
(WTO)'s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? This
Article argues that it is not, because the established, widespread,
and consistent assertion by states of public ownership over their
water resources through both municipal and international law (the
"public-ownership consensus") precludes any reading of GATT
that would fundamentally alter the unique status of those re-
sources. This Article therefore differs from others that have ad-
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Honorable Evan J. Wallach, U.S. Court of International Trade, 2009-11. I am grateful to
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the Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law for their generous assistance
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dressed this issue in that it first examines the broader legal context
in which the WTO exists and then considers how that context com-
pels an interpretation of "product" that excludes water resources.'
Why does the status of water matter? If water is considered a
product under GATT, it will be subject to that regime's trade disci-
plines, including two that could limit a state's ability to control the
export and hence the long-term management of its water. Article
I, the most-favored nation (MFN) clause, requires that a state that
accords "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" to any
product destined for one country must "immediately and uncondi-
tionally" accord that same benefit to like products destined for all
WTO members.2 Article XI bars the imposition of "prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges" on the
"exportation or sale for export of any product" absent an excep-
tion.3 Additionally, if water is a product under GATT, it will be a
good under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and subject to that regime's more rigorous disciplines.'
There are normative arguments both for and against subject-
ing water to GATT's disciplines. 5 On one hand, the WTO's goal of
"allowing the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development '6 relates as much to
water as it does to any other resource. Like other resources, water
has an economic value that motivates its transfer within and among
countries and that can be maximized according to the principle of
comparative advantage. And like other resources, water can be
subjected to measures motivated by and depicted as some mixture
of protectionism and environmentalism. GATT provides a frame-
work (described below) for vindicating comparative advantage
while parsing a measure's economic and environmental elements.
On the other hand, this framework is imperfect and dominated by
1 In this Article, the argument that GAT[ "does not apply" to water is shorthand for
the argument that GATT's trade disciplines do not apply to water. GATT can still "apply"
to water by implicitly excluding water from its definition of product.
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
3 GATT 1994, art. XI(1).
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992 [hereinafter NAFTA], art.
201; see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, Water Transfers and International Trade Law, in EDrrH
BROWN WEISS ET AL., FRESH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 67 (2005).
5 See generally WEISS, supra note 4, at 80-83.
6 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter WTO].
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trade values and voices. The application of GATT's priorities, dis-
ciplines, and tribunals to water would reduce the flexibility and fi-
nality that states exercise in the long-term management of their
waters.
As a descriptive matter, however, states could not have in-
tended to abrogate this flexibility and finality through GATT.
Before developing that argument in section three, this article first
considers other analytical approaches to the question of the status
of water under GATT.
II. DETERMINING THE STATUS OF WATER
Others have asked whether and how GATT applies to water,
often with an eye toward minimizing the effect of that regime on
state prerogative. The most straightforward approach argues that
water in its bulk state is not a product under GATT because it is
not produced. The definition of product as "a substance produced
during a natural, chemical, or manufacturing process" implies that
"something must be done to water to make it a product, and that
mere diversion, pumping, or transfer does not suffice. As long as it
remains in its natural state or source, water could not be a 'prod-
uct'."7 This description, however, does little to distinguish water
from other unrefined natural resources like crude oil.
Other approaches accept the possibility that water might fall
under GATT and then contemplate different responses to the re-
gime's disciplines: ignore them, identify an exception to them,
avoid them, or adjust them. Under the "ignore" approach, mem-
bers might informally decline to subject water to GATT's disci-
plines in a manner akin to their treatment of oil. Because many
oil-exporting countries were not parties to the 1947 GATT and
some are still not members of the WTO, oil has been de facto ex-
empt from GATT's trade disciplines even though it "is considered
a product in the market place."'8 This "provides strong precedent
for not subjecting bulk transfers of water across natural borders to
the trade disciplines." 9
Under the "except" approach, a state might defend a measure
that would otherwise violate GATT by appealing to one of the re-
gime's exceptions. Article XI(2)(a) permits "[e]xport prohibitions
7 WEISS, supra note 4, at 69.
8 Id. at 84.
9 Id.
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or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting
contracting party."'" However, the restriction would need to be
both "temporary" and addressed to an actual or potential "critical
shortage."
Article XX, which applies both to export restrictions under ar-
ticle XI and to disparate treatment under article I, offers two addi-
tional exceptions. A state may take measures "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health" or "relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or
consumption" provided that "such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."'1
Under the "avoid" approach, a state could impose an export
duty on water high enough to make export economically impracti-
cal, because bulk water is not yet subject to a tariff binding under
GATT. Although some countries still impose export duties, the
constitution of the United States prohibits that country from doing
SO.12
Finally, under the "adjust" approach, states could "clarify"
GATT's application in one of four ways.13 First, although unlikely,
they could amend GATT to explicitly exclude water or broaden the
protections of article XX. Second, they could "agree to waive the
application of particular obligations" of GATT to bulk transfers of
water.'4 Third, they could adopt an interpretation of GATT that
excludes bulk water, provided that such an interpretation does not
"undermine" GATT's amendment procedures.' 5 The NAFTA par-
ties took a similar approach in declaring that "[w]ater in its natural
state.., is not a good or product, is not traded, and therefore is not
and never has been subject to the terms of any trade agreement. '16
10 GATIT art. XI(2)(a).
11 GATr art. XX.
12 WEiss, supra note 4, at 85.
13 Id. at 85-88.
14 Id. at 86.
15 Id. at 87 (quoting GATT art. IX).
16 WEISS, supra note 4, at 87 (quoting 1993 Statement by the Governments of Canada,
Mexico, and the United States).
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Fourth, assuming consensus, the parties might make an "ordinary
decision" about the status of water.
17
The members of the WTO could also use any of these adjust-
ment techniques to expressly endorse the approach described in
the following section. However, as the remainder of the article ar-
gues, such an endorsement is unnecessary in a legal sense, because
a proper construction of GATT in the context of broader law im-
plicitly excludes water from the definition of product.
III. THE PUBLIC-OWNERSHIP CONSENSUS
A. Overview of the Approach
This article proposes an alternative legal rationale for preclud-
ing the application of GATT to water. Water resources are owned
by the public, and one of the key rights of ownership is the privi-
lege of use before all others. If water were a product under GATT,
then "nonowners" would enjoy the same priority of use as the na-
tional "owner" in a way that would frustrate that national owner-
ship. GATT" therefore cannot apply to water unless that water has
been transformed from a resource into a product, and only the
state can determine as a matter of its municipal law when this con-
ceptual transformation occurs.
Under what can be called the public-ownership consensus,
states uniformly disavow private ownership of significant water re-
sources and instead assert some form of public ownership and con-
trol. This consensus, which both influences and reflects principles
of international law, militates against any extension of GATT to
the water resources themselves as objects of trade beyond the ab-
solute control of the domestic public. The text of GAT is too
vague to conclude that the parties could have intended or that the
text could effect such a dramatic change in both municipal and in-
ternational law.
But can GATT apply to water even if it does not apply to
water resources? The article further argues that it cannot. Water
belongs to water resources, and water resources belong to the pub-
lic. Moreover, the line between water and waters is unclear, and
individuals enjoy at most a qualified right of use in either. "When
we determine water rights we establish use rights-not owner-
17 Id. at 88.
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ship" 1 8-and mere use rights are too abstract to be a product. In
short, it is for states to determine the scope of their public owner-
ship through management of use rights.
B. Special Status of Water Among Natural Resources
The danger of this argument is that, if it proves anything, it
might prove too much. If GATT does not apply to water, then why
should it apply to other natural resources? Or, phrased differently,
why shouldn't GATT apply to water if it applies to other natural
resources?
Answering this question is critical, because GATT does apply
in principle to most natural resources.1 9 If it did not, article XI's
inclusion of export restrictions and article XX's exception for mea-
sures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources" would be largely unnecessary. However, many countries
have also asserted "permanent sovereignty" over these resources,
and the United Nations General Assembly has asserted the "ina-
lienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth
and resources in accordance with their national interests. '20 This
notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has since
"evolved from a political claim to an accepted principle of interna-
tional law."
21
Fortunately, the argument that GAT-'s disciplines do not ap-
ply to water need not rely on this broader principle of sovereignty
over natural resources, because water is special. There are several
reasons why. First, water is both necessary and non-fungible. It is
a "unique source of life, comparable only with air, to which human
beings need to have recourse to live." It has at least four critical
18 ANTOINETIrE HILDERING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
WATER MANAGEMENT 98 (2004).
19 As noted above, GATT has not been applied to oil.
20 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14,
1962); see also Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, G.A. Res. 626 (VII)
(Dec. 21, 1952) ("The sovereign right of every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural
resources should be respected."). Both resolutions occurred after the initial ratification of
GATF, and resolution 1803 notes that the "exploration, development and disposition of
such resources, as well as the import .of the foreign capital required for these purposes,
should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely
consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohi-
bition of such activities." Although this could be read as a repudiation of GATT, the more
plausible reading is as an endorsement of the trade and investment regimes.
21 Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Re-
sources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 39 (2006).
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functions: health, habitat, transport, and production.22 All of these
functions in turn have both ecological and economic components.
For example, transport encompasses the movement of sediment,
nutrients, and other natural materials as well as the movement of
humans and their goods. Similarly, production encompasses pho-
tosynthesis (through the use of "green water") as well as domestic,
industrial, and other societal activity (through the use of "blue
water").
23
Second, water is part of a natural system-the hydrologic cy-
cle-that facilitates its use and reuse. Possession is fleeting, and
while water might be contaminated through that use, it is not de-
stroyed. Whereas the "disposition" of other natural resources
might occur prior to their use (such as upon extraction), the dispo-
sition of water occurs after its use. The public is a custodian as
much as it is an owner, and water management extends beyond
extraction through consumption and disposal.24
Finally, water is sui generis in the legal sense as well. Whereas
individuals might exercise more extensive rights over other natural
resources, they enjoy at most a qualified right "to use water con-
tained in a certain area at that given moment."25 Moreover, per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources is a relatively recent
and recently contentious notion.26 In contrast, as the next subsec-
tion demonstrates, the public-ownership consensus over water is a
longstanding, persistent, and global phenomenon.
C. Status of Water Under Municipal Law
Water resources belong to the public. That sentence, and the
following exposition of it, uses two necessarily ambiguous terms.
First, "ownership" has many different meanings. In civil-law coun-
tries it can refer to a unitary "triad of ownership," whereas in com-
mon-law countries it can refer rather informally to some or all of a
non-unitary "bundle of sticks. ' 27 Nonetheless, states and commen-
tators often invoke ownership (or a non-English term of roughly
22 M. Falkenmark, Water Scarcity-Challenges for the Future, in THE SCARCrrY OF
WATER: EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES, 26 (Edward Brans et al., eds., 1997).
23 Id. at 26.
24 See generally HILDERING, supra note 18, at 21-31.
25 Id. at 98.
26 See Duruigbo, supra note 21, at 33.
27 See Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Property Law, http://www.britannica.com/eb/
article-28515/property-law#927913.hook (last visited Apr. 14, 2009) (discussing unitary and
nonunitary concepts of ownership).
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equivalent meaning) in the context of water; their declarations of
public ownership are so emphatic that they need not be precise. In
other words, such ownership is above all the assertion of a para-
mount state interest.
Second, "water resources" has disparate municipal definitions
and, perhaps surprisingly, no international definition.28 States may
refer to their water, their waters, and/or their water resources. This
variation might reflect imprecise drafting, imperfect or impossible
translation, or actual substantive differences. As argued below,
however, this variation does not negate the existence of the public-
ownership consensus and instead implies that states enjoy the pre-
rogative to define the extent of their water resources.
1. Historical Development
Two themes emerge from an examination of the historical de-
velopment of water law. First, no system has provided for com-
pletely or even predominately private ownership of water.
Significant water resources have been either incapable of owner-
ship or owned by the state or the public. Individuals have enjoyed
use of, but not title in, water from those resources. Second, despite
the increasing privatization of service, the legal trend has been to-
ward greater public ownership of the water itself. This subsection
briefly traces five important currents in the history of water law:
the law of the Roman Empire, the Napoleonic Code, English com-
mon law, Soviet law, and Islamic law.29
Ancient Roman law recognized three categories of water re-
sources.30 No one, not even the sovereign, could claim title over
waters common to everybody (res comunis omnium), which in-
cluded all flowing waters.31 Municipalities and other public institu-
tions could claim title over public waters (res publicae) and grant a
right of use to others.32 Private landowners enjoyed an absolute
ownership interest in a small category called private waters, which
28 The International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), a nongovernmen-
tal organization, defines "water resources" as "water available, or being made available,
for use in sufficient quantity and quality at a location over a period of time appropriate for
an identifiable demand." See Water Resources, http://www.wca-infonet.org/cds-static/en/
waterresourcesen_1006_all_1.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
29 See generally DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRA-
TION: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 59-132 (2d ed. 2007).
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included "rainwater, groundwater and minor water bodies."33
Nonetheless, most of the Roman Empire's viable water resources
could only be used rather than owned.34
The French Napoleonic Code abolished the Roman category
of common waters and distinguished between private waters ("lo-
cated below, along or on privately owned land") and public waters
(considered navigable or floatable).35 This distinction spread to
other states in continental Europe and then to the colonies of these
civil-law countries.36 Many of these countries subsequently ex-
panded the category of public waters at the expense of the category
of private (or, later, non-domanial) waters. In France, public wa-
ters came to include those that are navigable and floatable, those
"acquired by the state for the purpose of public works," and those
"necessary for domestic water supply, agriculture and industrial
production." A 1992 French law declared that "all water resources,
whether surface or underground" were a "common asset of the na-
tion" such that "water may only be subject to use rights.
37
Unlike the Napoleonic Code, English common law maintained
the notion of waters common to everybody that existed in Roman
law. 8 Critically, "[n]ot even the Crown can own water. 39 Under
the common law's riparian doctrine, "there can be no ownership of
or right of property in the running water of streams, rivers or natu-
ral channels."4 Rather, this "transient and fugitive" water is
"common to all who can claim a right of access to it, and may be
used in a reasonable manner by a riparian landowner. "41 Private
ownership of rainwater and extracted groundwater is "limited to
the time of possession."4 Statutory law, particularly the permit
system, has since made substantial inroads into the riparian
doctrine.43
The Soviet constitution established that "'waters ... are the
property of the Socialist Soviet State, that is, a matter of all peo-
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 69.
36 Id. at 69-70.
37 Id. at 71.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 73.
40 Id. at 74.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 77-78.
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ple."'4 Although water resources were owned exclusively by the
state, individuals could appropriate water itself (as a "dynamic sub-
stance") through lawful activities.45 This communitarian concep-
tion of water has continued to influence countries within the
former Soviet bloc.46 While Russia and some Western-oriented
states have established private ownership of water resources lo-
cated entirely within private land, "in most former Soviet countries
water resources continue to be considered a public good.
47
The precepts of Islam also reflect a communitarian conception
of water. Mohammed is said to have declared water to be the
''common entitlement of all Moslems" and to have prohibited its
sale.48 Islamic water law recognizes and heavily regulates the
rights of thirst (chafa) and irrigation (chirb).4 9 It also contemplates
and regulates the "sale or transfer" of these rights. Although there
appears to be a split within Islamic water law on the treatment of
water from wells dug on private or unoccupied land, significant re-
strictions apply even where the owner of such a water supply can
sell the water at will. Under one rule, "the purpose of the sale
must be exactly known and stipulated; water cannot be sold in
globo. "50 Under another rule, water may be sold only in recepta-
cles, and "[a]ny other sale of water is void."'"
The Ottoman Civil Code reflected this developed custom by
defining "water which has not been appropriated," "water con-
tained in wells dug by unknown persons," and "water of the sea
and large lakes" as a "non-saleable commodity to which everyone
has a right."52 Unlike ancient Roman law, the code also declared
community ownership of groundwater.5 3 The collapse of the Otto-
man Empire generally resulted in a repudiation of its code and ei-
ther the reassertion of Islamic law or the adoption of British and
French law emphasizing the public ownership of water.54 Custom
has remained influential in countries that succeeded the Ottoman
44 Id. at 79.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 78, 84.
47 Id. at 84.
48 Id. at 62.
49 Id. at 63.
50 Id. at 64.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 65.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 68.
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Empire 5 5 and "modern codifications of water law aim at institu-
tionalizing, in one form or another, the concept of community of
interest in water resources.
56
2. Current Status
Today, water is unambiguously a public good. A survey of
current domestic water laws indentified forty-four countries in
which significant water resources belong to the state, the nation, or
the people; it identified no countries that disavowed such public
ownership.57
European countries have moved "either to abolish or to re-
strict the concept of private ownership of water, and to extend gov-
ernment control over all water uses and activities. ' 58 France
declared all water resources to be a shared asset of the nation in
1992, and Italy declared all water resources to be public in 1994. 59
With the exception of small water bodies in Russia, Estonia, and
Lithuania, all water resources in the countries of eastern European
are public.60
Under the riparian doctrine dominant in the eastern half of
the United States, surface waters are "a public resource, held in
trust for use by the people of the state."' 61 In contrast, under the
doctrine of appropriation dominant in the western half of the
United States, "the first person to use water acquires the right to its
future use as against later takers. ' 62 At first glance this doctrine
may appear merely to prescribe a rule of use that is only peripheral
to the question of ownership in the more fundamental and absolute
sense. However, a "water right acquired under the doctrine of ap-
propriation is generally considered to be real property, as opposed
to personal property." To the extent it contemplates private own-
ership of a real property interest in water, this doctrine is therefore
55 Id. at 69.
56 Id.
57 Water Law and Standards, http://www.waterlawandstandards.org (last visited Apr.
14, 2009). This searchable database of states' water laws and water-quality standards is a
joint project of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World
Health Organization. Citations to the site as a source for information about a state's laws
imply a search of the database. See also Waterlex, http://waterlex.fao.org (last visited Apr.
14, 2009).
58 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 110.
59 Id. at 110-11.
60 Id. at 111.
61 Id. at 126.
62 Id. at 127.
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somewhat anomalous and, in the context of the global trend to-
ward greater public ownership, possibly anachronistic.
Treatment of groundwater in the United States now roughly
parallels the treatment of surface water; eastern federal states plus
California tend to embrace some variant of reasonable use, while
western federal states adhere to a rule of appropriation. Notably,
only Texas maintains a rule of absolute ownership whereby "the
landowner owns, under the 'rule of capture,' all the water he cap-
tures through pumping. "63 Eastern federal states, in addition to
the United Kingdom, have abolished this rule.64
Australia's federal states have largely abandoned the riparian
doctrine in favor of a larger role for government management.65
Latin American countries generally assert public ownership
over "all water resources everywhere. In Panama, even meteoric
waters are public." 66 Groundwater has a more ambiguous status in
some South American countries but explicitly belongs to the public
domain in Argentina and Mexico, among others.67 Brazil divides
ownership over water resources between the union and its federal
states.68 Water is national property in Chile, although riparian
landowners can own minor internal lakes and springs.69 Ecuador's
civil code declares water to be a "good common to all," while its
water act declares all waters, whether surface or underground, to
be "national property for public use."7 In the Dominican Repub-
lic, all waters without exception belong to the Republic, "and their
dominion is inalienable, unlimited, and cannot be restricted. No
private right to own water exists, nor any right to acquire owner-
ship of water.
71
The Chinese state owns as public property all surface-water
and groundwater resources. 72 However, its 2002 water law pro-
vides that "the provisions of international treaties concerning
63 Id. at 128.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 98.
66 Id. at 106.
67 Id.
68 Water Law and Standards, supra note 57.
69 Id.
70 Id.; CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 107.
71 Water Law and Standards, supra note 57.
72 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 101.
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water shall prevail over those of the water law, unless express res-
ervation has been made."73
The water laws of other countries in Asia have been influ-
enced by French, German, Spanish, and U.S. water law; for exam-
ple, the Philippines and Taiwan incorporate some elements of the
doctrine of appropriation." Under Japanese law, "watercourses
belong to the public domain"75 and "the water of a river cannot be
made the object of a private right."76 Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-
nam have declared their water resources, respectively, to be public,
to belong to the state, and to belong to the national community,
even though there is an abundance of water in these civil law coun-
tries.7 7 The Indian constitution grants ownership of water to its
federal states.78
Most countries in the Middle East recognize Islamic custom-
ary water law, which has also influenced Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan.79 Jordan has declared all waters to be state prop-
erty. 0 The Indonesian constitution declares that water is "'a gift of
Almighty God, and shall be controlled by the state and utilized for
the greatest welfare of the people in a just and equitable
manner."'
81
The communitarian conception of water present in Islamic
customary law also continues to affect the legal regimes and actual
practice in many countries in Africa. 2 In African civil law coun-
tries, which number about 25, all waters are in the public domain.
83
For example, Libya considers all of its waters to be state prop-
erty.84 In African common law countries, which number about 15,
water is common to all "unless it has specifically been brought
under government control through legislation or judicial deci-
73 Id. at 101.
74 Id. at 97.
75 Id. at 101.
76 Water Law and Standards, supra note 57.
77 Id. at 97; Law on Water Resources of the Kingdom of Cambodia, art. 3 (entry into
force June 29, 2007), available at Faolex, Faolex No. LEX-FAOC075723, http://
faolex.fao.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
78 Id. at 99.
79 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 9.
80 Id. at 7, 102.
81 Id. at 102.
82 Id. at 96.
83 Id. at 93.
84 Id. at 93-94.
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sions. ' '8 Ghana vests property rights and control of water re-
sources in its president, "who holds them in trust for the people of
Ghana. '8 6 The Nigerian constitution places water resources under
the jurisdiction of the country's federal states.87 The Ethiopian
constitution establishes as government property "all resources in
the water. '88 Egyptian water law reflects a mixture of customary,
French, and British law that emphasizes government control.89
South Africa's national government holds the country's water as a
public trustee. 90
D. Status of Water Under Broader International Law
The previous subsection demonstrated the near unanimity
with which states have acted on the domestic level to reject the
private ownership of water in favor of a communitarian approach.
This subsection explores the legal significance of this apparent in-
ternational consensus that absolute private property rights do not
exist in nationally significant waters and that even if water from
these resources can be privately used, it cannot be privately owned.
The subsection considers, first, international implications of the do-
mestic shift and, second, similar flows on the international stage.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) enumerates three primary sources of international law: "(a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) interna-
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c)
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 91
The public-ownership consensus might constitute a general
principle of law that "can be derived from a comparison of the va-
rious systems of municipal law, and the extraction of such princi-
ples as appear to be shared by all, or a majority, of them."92 As the
85 Id. at 94.
86 Water Law and Standards, supra note 57.
87 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 94.
88 Id. at 95.
89 Id. at 96.
90 Water Law and Standards, supra note 57.
91 I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1). The other enumerated sources, "judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations," are "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law." Id.
92 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in MALCOLM D. EVANs, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 115, 128 (2d ed. 2006) (suggesting a competing interpretation of "general
principles" that nonetheless appears to embrace this foundation).
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previous subsection illustrated, a disavowal of private ownership is
common to virtually all of the systems of municipal law examined.
In other words, even though these systems differ in what particular
status they confer to water, they are uniform in what status they do
not confer.
The utility of this general principle of water resource owner-
ship may be limited, because general principles have tended to play
a limited role in international dispute settlement. On one hand,
the drafters of the ICJ Statute intended that these principles be
applied only in the absence of relevant treaty or customary law,93
and the ICJ has never found such an application to be necessary. 94
On the other hand, states have referenced general principles in
their submissions to the ICJ, and other arbitral bodies have in-
voked them.95 Moreover, a snapshot of international law derived
solely from the decisions of its circumscribed judicial bodies would
neglect the significant interpretation carried out by other actors
like states incidental to their application of and compliance with
that law.
One important question, applied in the next subsection to
GATT, is the extent to which a general principle might be used to
fill a gap in or provide context for international law derived from
treaty or custom. For example, assume that the Russian owner of
certain real property in Italy uses the Russia-Italy bilateral invest-
ment treaty (BIT) to challenge Italy's declaration that all of its wa-
ters are public. Might a tribunal conclude that no expropriation
occurred based in part on the unexceptional nature of Italy's
declaration?
The widespread acceptance of the public-ownership consensus
raises the possibility that this consensus may enjoy a legal status
beyond that of a general principle. For a rule to enter international
law as custom, it must reflect both "an established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States" 96 and a "belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it" (opinio juris).97 The special treatment of water across
the globe and since the time of ancient Rome is strong evidence of
state practice, but what about opinio juris?
93 Id. at 133.
94 Id. at 128.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 122.
97 Id. (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 44 (Feb. 20)).
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States might conclude that international law requires or invites
them to assert public control of water for several reasons. 98 First,
numerous treaties on shared water resources-such as the 1815
Treaty of Vienna internationalizing the rivers of Europe99-are in-
compatible with absolute private ownership. As the Deputy
United States Trade Commissioner noted in 1999:
There is a long-standing, well-developed body of international
law-reflected in thousands of international agreements over
literally hundreds of years-on the non-navigational uses of wa-
tercourses. Under this body of law, water resource management
rights belong to the country or countries where the watercourse
flows. We are not aware of any government having challenged
this principle in any forum, let alone before an international
trade body such as the World Trade Organization. °°
Second, public ownership of water facilitates-in theory if not
in practice-the satisfaction of other state obligations. The right to
water is recognized as an independent human right; as the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted
in 2002, "the right to water clearly falls within the category of guar-
antees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, partic-
ularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for
survival."' 1 1 Similarly, states have both the "sovereign right to ex-
ploit their own resources" and the "responsibility to ensure" that
their activities do not harm the environment of other states. 0 2
This discussion does require a caveat. The growing interna-
tionalization of human rights and environmental law might actually
undermine a state's assertion of a paramount interest in its water
for the exclusive use of its people. For example, if states cannot
deny the human right of water to those outside their borders, then
the disciplines of GAIT might be a method of vindicating that
right rather than an obstacle to its fulfillment. Nonetheless, this is
98 Attributing a state of mind to states-or proving the existence of such a mind-is a
rather daunting task. See, e.g., id. at 123.
99 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 190.
100 Letter from the Deputy United States Trade Representative (Nov. 24, 1999), http://
www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/IJC2000Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
101 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGr TO WATER (2003), available at http://
www.who.int/watersanitationhealth/rtwrev.pdf.
102 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1.
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speculative. "It would be going too far in the current state of inter-
national law to suggest that all freshwater is res communis. "103
E. Status of Water Under GATT
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
captures the rule for the interpretation of treaties under customary
international law: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 10 4
Although a textual approach dominates treaty interpretation,
article 31(3) provides that "any subsequent practice in the applica-
tion of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation" and "any relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties" must
also be taken into account "together with the context."' 1 5 Finally,
according to article 31(4), a "special meaning shall be given to a
term if it is established that the parties so intended.
°1 0 6
This subsection makes three arguments about the status of
water based on article 31. First, the public-ownership consensus
establishes that parties to both the original 1947 GATT and the
1994 GATT intended that "product" be defined in a way that ex-
cludes water. Second, as a "relevant rule of international law," the
public-ownership consensus supports such a definition. Third,
"subsequent practice" by the parties, particularly their widespread
assertion of public ownership, also supports such a definition.
The argument is not that the parties consciously intended that
"product" be defined in a way that excludes water. Rather, it is
that the parties could not have intended that "product" be defined
in a way that includes water, because such a definition would di-
minish the absolute ownership of water resources by the nation. In
other words, the right of first use implied by ownership conflicts
with the right of equal use implied by GATIT's MFN clause (article
I) and bar on export restrictions (article XI). A government that
103 HILDERING, supra note 18, at 97 (quoting S.C. McCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL WATERCOURSES: NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES 53, 57 (2001), noting that "it is critical
that states begin to conceive of the hydrologic cycle in this way.").
104 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (V.C.L.T.), art. 31(1), May 23,1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
10S Id. art. 31(3).
106 Id. art. 31(4).
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holds its water resources in trust for the nation would violate its
duty as trustee by diluting national control over those resources.
One might respond that the content of municipal law is irrele-
vant to intent for the purposes of treaty interpretation. A state
might well ratify a treaty as an impetus or mechanism for changing
its domestic law.10 7 It might ratify a treaty notwithstanding obvious
incompatibility with its domestic law.10 8 And it might ratify a
treaty with a misunderstanding of the obligations imposed by that
treaty. According to article 27 of the Vienna Convention, "a party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty." 10 9
The public-ownership consensus, however, is of an entirely dif-
ferent magnitude. If water is a product, then every single party to
the 1947 GATT would have been mistaken or insincere or poised
to change an important national principle without so much as a
mention of it. And then, in adopting the 1994 GAT', they along
with many new states would have done it again. This seems
implausible.
The more likely explanation is that states ratified a treaty that
comports with the public-ownership consensus as enshrined in mu-
nicipal and international law. A WTO tribunal, a WTO council, or
simply a state interpreting GATT could "take into account" this
consensus in giving meaning to "product"-a generalized term that
the treaty does not define.
The practice of states subsequent to their ratification bears out
such an interpretation. For example, France signed the original
GATT in 1947. At the time, the public domain included all "navi-
gable and floatable" waters. Seventeen years later, the public do-
main grew to include all waters necessary for "domestic water
supply [and] agricultural and industrial production."11 France sub-
sequently nationalized all of its waters in 1992, two years before
joining the WTO.111 The United States also signed GATT in 1947
and saw a reassertion and expansion of the public-trust doctrine by
107 As an example of impetus, the executive of a state might use a treaty to prompt the
legislature to enact statutory changes. As an example of mechanism, a self-executing
treaty becomes enforceable law in the United States.
108 See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, & John W. Meyer, Interna-
tional Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human
Rights Treaties, 23 INT'L SOC. 115, 115 (2008).
109 V.C.L.T., supra note 104, at art. 27.
110 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 70.
111 Id. at 71.
[Vol. 17:291
WATER AS A PUBLIC GOOD
its domestic state courts in the decades that followed.112 China
joined the WTO in 2002, the same year that it reiterated state own-
ership of all of its water resources.
113
Canada, Mexico, and the United States addressed the status of
"water in its natural state" in a 1993 joint statement intended to
"correct false impressions":
The NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of
any Party to the Agreement.
Unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and be-
come a good or product, it is not covered by the provisions of
any trade agreement including the NAFTA. And nothing in the
NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA Party to either exploit its
water for commercial use, or to begin exporting water in any
form. Water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aqui-
fers, water basins and the like is not a good or product, is not
traded, and therefore is not and never has been subject to the
terms of any trade agreement.
International rights and obligations respecting water in its natu-
ral state are contained in separate treaties and agreements nego-
tiated for that purpose. Examples are the United States-Canada
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the 1944 Boundary Waters
Treaty between Mexico and the United States.
114
This statement, while not authoritative to GATT, nonetheless
reveals state practice. As one author observes, the statement "left
as much open to question as it possibly could have" while address-
ing Canada's concerns about the potential vulnerability of its water
to export demands. 115 It is initially difficult to reconcile the claim
that nothing in NAFTA would oblige a party "to begin exporting
112 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194; Mary W. Blackford, Comment, Putting the Public's Trust Back in Zoning: How the
Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine Will Benefit Land Use Regulation, 43 Hous-
TON L. REV 1212, 1220-24 (2006), available at http://www.houstonlawreview.orglarchive/
downloads/43-4_pdf/Blackford.pdf.
113 CAPONERA, supra note 29, at 101.
114 Statement, Governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States (1993), available
at http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfo99/83067000_e.html#statement (emphasis added); see also
WEISS, supra note 4, at 69.
115 Howard Mann, Senior Int'l L. Advisor, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Address
Before I Seminario Latino-Americano de Politicas Publicas em Recursos Hidricos: Inter-
national Economic Law: Water for Money's Sake? 4 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at www.
howardmann.ca/pdfslWaterandInternationaleconomiclaw.pdf (This paper was prepared for
and presented at I Seminario Latino-Americano de Politicas Publicas em Recursos
Hidricos, which was held in Brazil on September 22, 2004).
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water in any form" with the implication that water is subject to that
agreement if it has entered into commerce and become a good or
product. That is, if Canada decides to use (i.e., convey use rights
for) its water domestically, wouldn't NAFTA and GATT article XI
then oblige Canada to permit the export of that water?
These two assertions can be reconciled if the first sentence is
treated as tautology: Water is covered by a trade agreement only if
it has both entered into commerce and become a good or product.
In short, water is a product under GATT only if it has entered com-
merce as a product. And, as argued below, only a state can make
this conceptual determination.
A 1999 submission by the Deputy United States Trade Repre-
sentative to the International Joint Commission similarly argues
that "the WTO simply has nothing to say regarding the basic deci-
sion by governments on whether to permit the extraction of water
from lakes and rivers in their territory.' 1 16 Importantly, this ex-
traction is exceedingly ordinary; states routinely satisfy their do-
mestic water needs by using their water resources both
commercially and non-commercially. If extraction compelled ex-
port, the WTO would have a very large say indeed.
117
The 1999 submission also describes how other states have ad-
dressed water without invoking the agreements or institutions of
the WTO:
Indeed, there is no indication in the negotiating history of, or
over 50 years of practice in, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and the WTO that governments have ever suggested
that international law governing water rights and water manage-
ment should be modified or superseded in any way through the
application of international trade rules. This is hardly surprising
given the fact that water resource management issues have been
and continue to be addressed through specific water rights trea-
ties between the countries where the watercourses are located.
Given the web of bilateral, regional, and international treaties
governing water rights and obligations between WTO member
governments, as well as the sovereign interest of all govern-
ments in managing the water resources in their territories, we
116 Letter from the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative to the International Joint Com-
mission (Nov. 24, 1999), in PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES app. 8, at 65 (2000),
available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/IJC200OReport.pdf.
117 Compare with Mann, supra note 115, at 6 (suggesting instead that there is no "defini-
tive answer on this 'tripwire' problem").
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consider it highly improbable that any government would seek
to bring international water rights issues before the WTO. Even
more extraordinary would be such a claim by a country that has
no territorial nexus to the watercourse at issue. Over the past 50
years, there has been no shortage of disputes between govern-
ments around the world over water rights claims. Notwithstand-
ing that fact, no government seeking access to water resources
controlled by another nation has ever sought to bring the matter
before the GATT or the WTO. We do not expect that situation
to change."1
8
This subsection has argued that water has no business in
GATI7, because its parties could not have intended to so diminish
the public ownership they have consistently asserted over this re-
source. Under the rules of customary international law governing
the interpretation of treaties, water cannot be a "product" for the
purposes of GAIT.
Nonetheless, some countries and commentators have acknowl-
edged that water in some forms may be subject to the disciplines of
GAT. The next subsection argues that the line between resource
and product must be a national determination.
F. Drawing Lines
Under the approach explained above, water cannot be a prod-
uct when it is a resource. However, water is found in many articles
of commerce that are treated as products-from bottled water to
juice to milk. Moreover, a number of agricultural and other prod-
ucts use a significant amount of water for their production: one ton
of grain requires one thousand tons of water,119 and an "automo-
bile coming off the assembly line ... will have used at least 120,000
litres of water-80,000 to produce its tonne of steel and 40,000
more for the actual fabrication process. '1 20
Water is listed in the World Custom Organization's Harmo-
nized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS); heading
22.01 includes "waters, including natural or artificial mineral and
aerated waters, not containing added sugar or other sweetening
matter or flavored; ice and snow"-to which an explanatory note
118 Letter from the Deputy U.S. Trade Rep. to the Int'l Joint Comm'n, supra note 116.
119 LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., THE EARTH POLICY READER 42 (2002).
120 The Management of Water: Water Use-Industrial Use, ENVIRONMENT CANADA,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/Water/en/manage/use/emanuf.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
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adds "ordinary water of all kinds (other than sea water). '121 How-
ever, as the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade stresses, the HS "does not tell us if and when water is
a [product]; it only tells us that when water is classified as a [prod-
uct], it falls under a particular tariff heading.
122
What does tell us if and when water is a product? Some au-
thors have suggested criteria relating to the quantity of water trans-
ferred, the means of transfer, the degree of human intervention,
the nature of the transfer agreement, and the financial aspects of
the transaction.123 For example, application of GATT's trade disci-
plines might depend on "whether the payment is for the actual
water or for the delivery of the water, in which case it constitutes a
trade in services. "124
The more relevant question, however, is not what should dis-
tinguish water as a resource from water as a product but rather
who should make that distinction. Because of the public-owner-
ship consensus, each state necessarily retains that prerogative. Act-
ing as a sovereign or as a trustee, each state regulates whether,
when, where, how, how much, by whom, and for what purpose the
water from its water resources is used. The thrust of the public-
ownership consensus is therefore that a paramount public interest
exists in controlling and by implication defining national water re-
sources. Much like a national-security exception,125 this consensus
recognizes a sphere of activity that is insulated from international
economic regulation. GATT "simply has nothing to say" about a
121 WEISS, supra note 4, at 67 (citing World Customs Organization, Harmonized Com-
modity Description and Coding System: Explanatory Notes (3d ed. 2002)).
122 Bulk Water Removals and International Trade Considerations: Document from the
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (November 16, 1999), in
PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES, supra note 116, at 67.
123 See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 4, at 68, 69; Esther J. de Haan, Balancing Free Trade in
Water and the Protection of Water Resources in GATT, in THE SCARCITY OF WATER:
EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 22, at 245, 248-49; HILDERING,
supra note 18, at 111.
124 HILDERING, supra note 18, at 111. One author has implicitly suggested that water
might not constitute a product until it has actually been traded between states. See WEISS,
supra note 4, at 68 ("Should the diversion or pumping cross national borders, it would be
subject to the trade disciplines."). This approach, which would in effect apply GATT arti-
cle I but negate GATT article XI, must be premised on some differentiation between do-
mestic and international water transfers. The public-ownership consensus could supply a
basis for this differentiation: An article might not constitute a product until it enters com-
merce, and water might not enter commerce until it is alienated from its national public
owners.
125 See, e.g., GATT art. XXI.
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predominately noneconomic sphere that is subject to paramount
state interests.
1 2 6
If states determine the scope and status of their water re-
sources, then water is not a product unless the state in which it
momentarily resides treats it as such. A state might narrowly de-
fine its water resources as encompassing only major lakes and riv-
ers, or it might expansively define them as encompassing all water
in all forms in or on its territory. GATT's disciplines apply to eve-
rything beyond but nothing within that state-defined sphere of
water resources.
This is not to suggest that state discretion is without bounds.
States have explicitly situated certain articles within the ambit of
international economic law. For example, the Agreement on Agri-
culture reaches agricultural products even if they contain or were
produced with a significant amount of water. Similarly, a state
could elect to list its water sector in a schedule under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Notably, however, no
state had done so as of 2004.127 Beyond the WTO, states have also
explicitly assumed a number of water-related obligations grounded
in international human rights law and international environmental
law. 128 These obligations may well require states to permit the "ex-
port" of water to satisfy basic human needs or prevent damage to a
downstream habitat.
129
In short, states could certainly globalize or privatize their
water resources as well as the management of those resources.
However, the established, widespread, and consistent assertion by
states of public ownership over their water resources combined
with the lack of specificity in GAT strongly suggests that they
have not done so through this component of international eco-
nomic law.
126 Robert J. Girouard, Water Export Restrictions: A Case Study of WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 260-61 (2003) (describ-
ing an "institutional approach" to determining the application of GATT to water).
127 See Mann, supra note 115, at 10; see also WTO Services Database, WTO, http://
tsdb.wto.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). A search of this database suggests that no state
has bound its water services since 2004.
128 See Status of Water Under Broader International Law, supra Part III.
129 See, e.g., Roberto A. Sanchez, Water Conflicts Between Mexico and the United States:
Toward a Transboundary Regional Water Market?, in THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERG-
ING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES, supra note 22, at 260, 260-67 (describing water con-
flicts between Mexico and the United States).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Water is unique. Perhaps because of its unique status in the
world, water also enjoys a unique status in municipal and interna-
tional law. Interpreting GAT in light of this public-ownership
consensus suggests that water by itself is not a product for the pur-
poses of that agreement. In addition, it is up to each state, acting in
its role as sovereign or trustee, to determine when its water is
transformed from a resource to a product. As a result, GATT
should not preclude states from restricting the export of their
water.
And yet it is common for GATF's trade disciplines not to ap-
ply to something that is anomalous or sensitive. The treaty pro-
vides explicit exceptions for measures "necessary to protect public
morals" and "relating to the importations or exportations of gold
or silver," among several others.130 Nontangible commodities like
currency are not generally considered products for the purposes of
GATI.13 1 The regime's application to agricultural products was
limited for decades,132 and oil still enjoys a de facto exemption.
Natural air would also seem a rather unlikely candidate for trade
disciplines.
The members of the WTO could agree to bring water under
GATT's trade disciplines or to address it through another mecha-
nism of international economic law; as described above, there are
advantages to treating water as an economic good. They could also
rely on other areas of international law concerning human rights,
the environment, and sustainable development to account for the
uneven global distribution of this fundamental natural resource.
The public-ownership consensus may shift as states confront grow-
ing domestic, regional, and global water challenges. But regardless
of whether states choose to globalize, retrench, or reassert this con-
sensus, it is where they should begin.
130 See GATT art. XX. As discussed above, however, these exceptions do have
limitations.
131 See Jacob Werksman, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO, 8 REV.
EUR. COMMUNITY & ITrr'L ENVTL. L. 251, 255 (1999) ("WVTO Members understand prod-
ucts to be 'tangible' goods ... Indeed, many forms of financial instrument, including cur-
rency, have been traded internationally for decades, but none have been considered to be
'products' for GATT purposes.").
132 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 322 (3d ed. 2005).
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